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I 
Resumo 
 
O acesso a serviços disponíveis na Internet expõe os utilizadores a diversos ataques, tal como o Man-
in-the-Middle (MitM). As defesas para estes ataques, tais como autenticação mútua através de uma 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), baseiam-se em infra-estruturas complexas que os utilizadores não 
estão disponíveis para utilizar e suportar. A enorme aceitação de métodos de autenticação designados 
por “acto de fé” (leap-of-faith) ou “confiar na primeira utilização” (TOFU, trust-on-first-use), 
utilizado em implementações comuns de SSH e TLS/SSL, dão sinais claros da pré-disposição dos 
utilizadores em sacrificar a segurança em prol de uma melhor usabilidade. Aliás, este é um 
comportamento comum na vida quotidiana das pessoas. Se alguém se apresentar apenas com um 
cartão de visita, teremos tendência a confiar no seu conteúdo. Apenas desconfiaremos se, mais tarde, 
outra identificação for apresentada. Por outras palavras, confiamos nas primeiras credenciais 
apresentadas.  
Esta temática foi abordada por soluções como o Perspectives, que fornecem autenticação tipo SSH 
com sondagens através de múltiplos caminhos/acessos, descrito em [1]. Através da observação e 
recolha das chaves públicas observadas ao longo do tempo por servidores espalhados 
geograficamente, designados por Notários, o Perspectives impede muitos dos ataques possíveis num 
cenário de TOFU. Um utilizador pode solicitar o historial de chaves de um determinado serviço, 
comparando-o à chave oferecida na utilização corrente, e com esse historial tomar uma decisão mais 
informada quanto ao aceitar uma chave que não exista em cache. 
No entanto, o Perspectives assume um certificado por sítio, o que não é um pressuposto válido em 
muitos casos. Nesse caso, como pode o utilizador distinguir entre um certificado adicional 
introduzido pelo serviço a que está a aceder, e uma situação de ataque, em que o certificado está a ser 
fornecido pelo atacante? A presente tese endereça esta temática de poligamia de certificados, 
aumentando a visão dos Notários por forma a fornecer uma visão consolidada de diversos 
certificados. Adicionalmente, sugerimos alterações a alguns módulos do Perspectives, 
nomeadamente o módulo de sondagem (probing) for forma a lidar com questões tais como existência 
de mecanismos de caching acoplados aos serviços, pela utilização de, por exemplo, proxies.   
 
Palavras chave: Certificados digitais, Perspectives, segurança, Certification Authority, SSL 
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Abstract 
 
Users are vulnerable to attacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack, whenever they resort to 
services in the Internet. Common defenses for these attacks, like mutual authentication based, for 
example, on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), rely on complex infra-structures that users are 
unwilling to support. Huge acceptance of simple methods like Trust-on-first-use (TOFU, also known 
as “leap-of-faith” authentication), employed by popular implementations of SSH and TLS/SSL, 
clearly indicate that users are prepared to sacrifice security for the sake of low-cost and more usable 
solutions. Moreover, this is a behavior that users are familiar with. If one meets a person who hands 
over some credentials, such as nickname, email address or even a business card, one will bind those 
credentials to that person in all future contacts, without initially asking for his or her ID. In other 
words, one trusts these credentials on the first time they are seen, and then uses them in all future 
interactions with that person. 
This topic has been addressed previously in solutions like Perspectives, which provides SSH-style 
Host Authentication with Multi-Path Probing, as described in [1]. By observing and collecting the 
server’s public keys over time, maintaining them in a set of geographically disperse servers known as 
“Notaries”, Perspective thwarts many of the attacks that are possible in a TOFU scenario. A user can 
download such records on demand, comparing them with the current key provided by the site being 
accessed. Although not secure to all attacks, users can make a more educated decision on accepting 
or rejecting each certificate. 
However, Perspectives assumes one certificate per site, which is a false assumption in some cases. 
So, how can users differentiate between a distinct, legitimate certificate provided by the site, and a 
fake certificate provided by an attacker? This thesis addresses this certificate polygamy issue, by 
enhancing the concept of the Notaries used in Perspectives, and provides a consistent view of a set of 
certificates to the user. Moreover, it suggests changes in modules like the probing module, to keep a 
clear and consistent observation of certificates, despite caching and reutilization made by 
components such as proxies. 
By allowing the user (or, by company policies) to fine tune some configuration parameters, the 
proposed solution will provide different levels of confidence to the observed server’s public keys, 
thus satisfying distinct levels of security, or user proficiency. 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Whenever surfing the Internet, our expectations and needs regarding authentication vary according to 
the nature of the task we are performing, and the value of the information we are accessing. We can 
categorize the authentication needs as: 
► Anonymous access 
As stated by Ed Schwartz  [2], anonymity can be beneficial in a variety of applications. Web 
sites for whistle-blowers wanting to report abuses without fear of reprisal, like online support 
groups for sensitive issues such as victims of domestic violence, police abuse or corrupt 
political and public service employees. However, there is a thin line, when using anonymity, 
separating legitimate well-behaved users and malicious ones that resort to anonymity to 
perform malicious actions (such as spam or virus dissemination and later carry out attacks 
like distributed denial of service). Unfortunately, when it comes to protecting the consumer 
(at least the legitimate, well-behaved consumer), the balance favors the Internet Service 
Providers (ISP), allowing them to de-anonymize or black-list users for any reason at any time. 
Some proposals, such as the one from Ed Schwartz, establish the concept of contract 
anonymity, where the service provider guarantees anonymity and unlinkability as long as the 
user complies with the contract. 
► One way authentication – Service to User 
This is the case where the Service needs to authenticate to the User, but there is no need for 
the User to authenticate to the Service. This can occur, for example, while doing digital cash 
donations to a social charity organization. The donor wants to be sure that he or she is helping 
the legitimate organization, by accessing its site and not a fake one, but keeping his identity 
hidden.  
► One way authentication – User to Service 
This is the case opposite the previous one, that is, where the user needs to authenticate to the 
service, but there is no need for the Service to authenticate to the user. Voting for a TV reality 
show may prevent users from voting twice by authenticating them, but the service 
authentication overhead may not be necessary. 
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► Two way authentication 
This is the more complex scenario, where both user and service need to authenticate to each 
other. Common cases include home banking, as well as finance and public administration, 
due to financial impact, credibility and damages, among others. 
 
If one maps the previous categories of authentication needs to real world implementations, one will 
find different usage of each method. For example, home banking solutions are sometimes 
implemented without two way authentication or with weak forms of client authentication. In the 
following cases, which are representative due to the importance of the institutions, they resort to 
simpler types of authentication. They only provide weak security mechanisms for the user to 
authenticate to the Home Banking Service, instead of what we call client authentication in the sense 
of the establishment of a secure communication channel. Some examples of this client authentication 
include the use of a PKI where the customer possesses a digital certificate, possibly safeguarded by a 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) or a less complex solution using a token generated by a physical 
device, such as the one used by Paypal, in Figure 1 or the display card from ActivIDentity, in Figure 
2.  
 
 
Figure 1 – One-time password generator key device 
 
 
Figure 2 – Display card token generator 
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Is this simplicity of username/password to authenticate the customer acceptable, from the bank’s 
perspective? Delivering a service vulnerable to so many attacks, when the image that they are trying 
to transmit to the consumer is security? Yes, because contractually, they assign to the user the 
responsibility with regard to any security breach, so their calculations are quite simple: it is cheaper 
to blame the user than to provide an adequate infra-structure to deliver two way authentication. Is 
this legal? Yes, for the time being. Do users allow it? By the success and use of home banking, we 
know they (we) do. 
Consider as an example home banking applications. In most cases, the user is not aware of the 
changes in the pages as he navigates until the final destination. Let us analyze the access to the site of 
BES – Banco Espírito Santo, a leading bank in Portugal (starting from Figure 3). 
 
   
Figure 3 - Access from an insecure page to an https page for the user to request a digital certificate 
 
By clicking on the image, the user would be redirected to https://bes-sec.bes.pt/wclientes/cb/tplsp.asp 
as illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 - Legitimate link to request a digital certificate 
 
This simple step performed by the user is potentially vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) 
attack. For example, malicious hosts on a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) can spoof 
ARP/DNS requests (e.g., ARPIFrame [4] is a worm that injects malicious HTML code into local 
HTTP traffic) to valid users as soon as access to the network is obtained. Public access points and 
home routers may be poorly administered or have known vulnerabilities. For example, Pharming 
attacks [5][6], where simple vulnerabilities in home routers expose end hosts to “drive-by pharming” 
attacks that use DNS to redirect clients fake versions of security-sensitive websites, or the more 
sophisticated Dynamic Pharming Attack [7] that  hijacks DNS, sending to the victim’s browser 
malicious JavaScript, which then exploits DNS rebinding vulnerabilities and the name-based same-
origin policy to hijack a legitimate session after authentication has taken place. As a result, the attack 
works regardless of the authentication scheme used. 
 
A simple DNS spoofing attack will enable the replacement of the link associated with the image to 
request the certificate, from the original https://bes-sec.bes.pt/wclientes/cb/tplsp.asp to something 
malicious, like https://bes-sec.banco-bes.com//wclientes/cb/tplsp.asp or similar, using an apparently 
harmless domain name, available and easy to register (see Figure 5). This will forward the user to a 
5 
malicious site, making the user vulnerable to various types of attacks, including the theft of their 
legitimate credentials. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Attacker replaces the link to a malicious site 
 
In this case, the user will be provided with a certificate issued by the attacker, and since the domain 
is registered, and the certificate issuer would match the site, the user would be misled into accepting 
the certificate as a legitimate certificate issued by his bank. 
Other related example is given by Bruce Schneier in [3], where users are redirected to “secure” sites 
with certificates owned by entities different than the ones managing the sites. According to PKI 
rules, any user should abort such connection, as this corresponds to a behavior equivalent to MitM 
attack (the situation that a PKI should prevent). 
As users became aware of the security issues that might affect them, the problems mentioned above 
will become less prevalent. In the thesis, we will address a complementary problem which is related 
to the use of certificates that are not signed by a Certification Authority (CA) trusted by the browser. 
In this case, when the user accesses the site, he or she receives an alert similar to Figure 6 and Figure 
7. 
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Figure 6 – Access to a site with a certificate issued by an unknown CA, using Microsoft IE 8 
 
 
Figure 7 – Access to a site with a certificate issued by an unknown CA, using Mozilla Firefox 3.6.10 
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An equivalent warning is issued by popular SSH clients (see Figure 8). From the point of view of the 
users, these warnings are very unfriendly, since they provide no additional information, and require a 
difficult decision to be made – either trust the certificate and use the site, or do not trust it and then 
became unusable to carry out some action.   
 
 
  Figure 8 – SSH warning about a new certificate 
 
In summary, there are basically three alternatives for a user to handle the Certificate received from 
the site:  
► Public Key Infrastructure 
Public Key Infrastructure relies on trusted entities (e.g., Verisign, UTN-USER) that issue 
certificates to entities that have been formally verified, usually with significant, manual 
effort. Users (and small companies) cannot afford to pay the high verification costs of such 
certificates, and end-up having to trust the browser policies to decide if a certificate is 
acceptable or not. Alternatively, the user is asked to indicate if he or she wants to accept 
the certificate, without much information to support the decision. 
► Offline or off-path validation 
The user might use a separate, secure channel, to validate the information. For example, he 
or she may use the phone and call the help desk to validate the 32 characters of the key 
fingertips as illustrated in Figure 8. This method ends up not being very useful in practice 
because often users are not willing to spend time with these calls.   
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► TOFU 
Without a solution to protect users from totally insecure protocols, such as telnet, the SSH 
model of authentication emerged as an affordable and pragmatic solution to the user. SSH 
relies on verifying unknown public keys before accepting them as valid. Once a user 
accepts a public key, it is deemed valid by the client and cached locally to be used in 
future authentications with that same server. Although users should verify thoroughly each 
new key (for example, by using a separate secure channel or by validating certificate 
fingerprints), most users immediately accept the certificate on the first access. That is, the 
user is assuming that there is no adversary in that first connection and for this reason is 
called trust-on-first-use (TOFU). The same problem is present if no validation is made 
later on when a certificate changes, and a new one, different from the cached, is presented 
to the user. In both cases, during that period when the certificate is received for the first 
time, the user is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
 
To help the user decide either to accept or reject the new certificate, Perspectives supplies to the user 
valuable additional information regarding the certificate (for example, SSH to access an end host or 
HTTPS to access a web site that uses a self-signed SSL certificate), leveraging views from multiple 
network vantage points, avoiding misinformation that could be introduced by localized attacks. It 
uses a set of publicly available servers (designated by Notaries), that keep track of the history of the 
public keys used by each network server, associated to a specific service, over time. By dispersing 
geographically the location of each Notary, a specific MitM attack only affects a specific Notary, 
allowing the remaining Notaries to provide the correct information (which can then be voted by the 
client). Much like to a real Notary, the Notary of Perspectives cryptographically signs (notarizes) 
statements saying that at time t it observed service S using public key PKu. 
 
1.2 Summary of the Solution 
Our solution extends the scope of Perspectives, in two main areas. First, for globalization, extends 
the concept of Quorum acceptance based on political and/or geographical areas, introducing the 
concept of Zones, allowing the user the ability to accept a quorum achieved by Notaries localized in 
a minimum number of distinct political and/or geographical areas. Second, it handles cases where 
sites have a set of certificates, instead of the typical one-to-one relationship between site, service and 
certificate. Our improvements allows Perspectives to make a distinction between single and multiple 
certificate sites, applying the coupon collector solution based on the fact that at least two coupons 
(certificates) will denote a multiple certificate site, and using probabilities to validate the assumed 
population size. The proposed solution requires changes to the following modules of Perspectives: 
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►Probing 
If the site/service has only a certificate, probing will determine if a certificate change has 
occurred. Only after as continuous, consistent observation of a new certificate, will a site be 
promoted to multiple certificate, since the Notary has to determine if the previous certificate is 
still observed (in this case, two certificates are seen consistently by the Notaries, denoting the 
introduction of another certificate) or it will no longer be seen, which is the case of a certificate 
replacement. Probing will be made to multiple certificate sites, until a level of confidence is 
achieved, based on the number of certificates observed versus the number of probes made so 
far. We will apply the Coupon Collector Problem to determine the level of confidence. 
 
►Threshold and Quorum Parameters 
We will suggest changes to the threshold and quorum parameters in order to consider single or 
multiple certificate sites, and also reflecting the case where caching may occur, which could 
prevent some certificates from being seen by specific Notaries. 
 
►Client Policies 
Client policies will be enhanced to reflect the zone concept, and the possible different values 
for threshold and quorum parameters, when encountering a single or a multiple certificate site. 
This will reflect the expectation of a higher consensus in single certificate sites, versus a 
multiple certificate site, since caching may hide some certificates based on the Notary IP 
address. 
 
►Cross-validation Protocol and Shadow Servers 
Shadow servers will replicate the certificates observed by each Notary. In single certificate 
sites, Notary and service will identify a unique entry in the shadow server. However, a multiple 
certificate site will contain as many entries as the number of certificates observed by each 
Notary/service. We will enhance the cross-validation protocol with an extra parameter to 
identify the certificate we are currently looking at. 
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1.3 Organization of the document 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the current status of digital 
certificate handling, including an overview of Perspectives. Chapter 3 describes our solution. Our 
experiments and results are presented in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 summarizes the conclusions and 
proposes future work directions. 
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Chapter 2   
Background 
 
2.1 General problems 
Internet (in)security is a well-known problem that goes much further than simple physical 
eavesdropping, or altered or injected packets. These problems have been around for more than a 
decade, and they have been discussed in several papers, such as [11]. 
In this section, we address the following two questions: 
►How insecure is the Internet today?  
►Is the existent insecurity relevant to MitM attacks? 
Amongst the most common vulnerabilities are: 
►TCP Sequence Number Prediction 
Initially described by Morris [12] in 1985, if the attacker can predict the sequence number 
in the TCP packet, he or she can construct a new packet and send responses to the host, 
without ever having established a connection with it. This allows, for instance, the attacker 
to spoof packets in the same network. 
 
Figure 9 – Sequence number in TCP packet 
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►Source routing abuse 
In source routing, the source specifies the nodes that packets should visit on the way to the 
destination, instead of using the default route. Source routing is useful to circumvent a 
failed node (Figure 15), or to choose a more appropriate path to comply with Quality of 
Service (QoS) requirements.  
Since it is also expected that the destination replies follow the reverse path of the source 
route, an attacker can pick any address or alter the source route to include himself in the 
path. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Source route to circumvent failed node 
 
►Routing Information Protocol (RIP) 
RIP is used to propagate routing information on local networks. It is a simple protocol that 
allows an attacker to inject false or non-existing route information, leading traffic, for 
example, to him (eavesdropping the connection) or to a non-existing network (creating a 
black hole). 
 
►Exterior Gateway Protocol (EPG) 
Intended for communication between core network gateways, EPG is vulnerable to attacks 
such as impersonating that a gateway is temporarily down. Although this type of 
vulnerability is not the best to illustrate the cases of attacks at the edge, it shows the range 
of TCP Internet vulnerabilities. 
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►Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
ICMP is a core protocol in the IP protocol suite (shown in Figure 16), and is used to report 
network errors when processing datagrams and provide administrative tools, status 
messages and reports. ICMP is neither secure nor reliable, lacks of any authentication 
mechanism and IP must act upon reception of ICMP messages. This makes ICMP 
extremely vulnerable and easily attacked. In particular, blind attacks can be made without 
specific knowledge of the connection’s characteristics, enabling an off-path attacker to 
succeed with a very high probability. 
 
Figure 11 – Architecture of the TCP/IP protocol suite 
 
►Finger Service 
The Name/Finger protocol was designed to provide information on a particular computer 
system or a particular person at network sites. The goal was to provide information on 
other users of the network, such as their full name, phone number, mail address, etc. 
Information on who is logged-in was useful to check the availability of a person to meet. 
Running this service is giving away valuable information that can be misused, even if 
there were no vulnerabilities in the implementation. However this information can be used 
to crack passwords, as explained by Grampp and Morris in [14]. 
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►Domain Name System (DNS) 
DNS provides a distributed database for translating host names to IP addresses. Interfering 
with DNS is probably one of the most rewarding attacks, since it opens varied 
vulnerabilities, like denial of service, MitM and credential theft.  
 
►File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 
Although the protocol itself is not considered flawed, some aspects are potentially unsafe. 
Anonymous FTP is used often in the Internet, but care should be taken to protect those 
files. An infected file could be disastrous. Inherent to anonymous access is the problem of 
not knowing who has requested those files. When using authentication in FTP, the service 
relies on a user/password combination that for some applications might be considered 
inappropriate in terms of security. One-time password implementations are now becoming 
popular. 
 
►Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 
SNMP is used for network management, and, as such, should be protected because it has 
access to network resources (routers, switches, servers, workstations, printers, racks, 
Storage Area Networks and much more). Although this principle is defended in the RFC 
1157 - Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), it also allows weak 
implementations, including null authentication services. Here are some examples why 
protecting SNMP is considered, in areas like date and time: 
►Time synchronization 
From a security perspective, effective understanding of security incidents 
requires matching the events timestamps on all log files. Any discrepancies 
will complicate or sabotage legal proceedings. 
►Software 
There is a lot of software that requires accuracy to work, from development 
tools like make to RSA SecurID or Kerberos. 
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►Network Time Protocol 
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol for synchronizing the clocks of computer 
systems over packet-switched, variable-latency data networks. Since a large variety of 
security algorithms and solutions rely on time, external control of it is a giant step towards 
insecurity.  
 
Although specific defenses may be used to prevent some of these attacks, all of them would benefit 
from these generic protection mechanisms: 
►Authentication 
We need to rely on a more secure solution than the simple IP source address supplied by 
the protocol suite. Since we are avoiding complex solutions that rely on heavily managed 
infra-structures, one could use the same authentication mechanisms based on asymmetric 
keys and digital certificates, without the overhead of a full PKI implementation.  
 
►Encryption 
A suitable encryption implementation can be an effective mechanism to prevent most of 
the vulnerabilities outlined previously. Performing link-level encryption can even protect 
against physical intruders who connect directly to the wired or wireless medium. 
 
►Trusted Systems 
If we can manage all the systems involved in the operation we are trying to secure, we 
might have some confidence on the level of security available. However, when accessing 
global services in the Internet, most of the equipment we must rely on is outside our 
control. As we present later on, even home equipments are hard for a common user to 
guarantee its reliability. We must trust on mechanisms based on quorums to provide some 
level of trust on the provided information – this is the solution currently employed by 
Perspectives. 
 
TLS/SSL and SSH provide a generic way for a user to connect to a remote server in a secure fashion. 
They provide a method to create a secure channel (authentication, integrity, and confidentiality) 
between the sender and receiver, which is able to mitigate most of the attacks discussed throughout 
this section. 
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These approaches, however, can still be attacked. 
Popular applications like dsniff provide several tools, including sshmitm and webmitm, which 
implement active MitM attacks against redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions by exploiting weak 
bindings in PKI. Although a properly configured client should warn the user about issues related 
with the server’s certificate, the attack is still possible. With a poorly configured client or a less 
stringent user, the attack becomes even easier.  
A normal SSL session should authenticate the server to the client using a certificate. However, SSL 
does not require the client to authenticate to the server, which can create security flaws. An SSL 
client should warn the user if any of these conditions are meet during a normal SSL session: 
►The certificate was signed by a certificate authority that is not recognized 
There are some reasons why the effectiveness of this warning is extremely unreliable. On 
one hand, some servers use self-signed certificates. Users have seen this warning quite 
often in the past, and tend to access the site despite the warning. Another reason is the 
legitimacy of the CA itself. Alexander Sotirov et al. [13] showed how to create a rogue 
certification authority certificate trusted by all common web browsers, by taking advantage 
of a weakness in the MD5 cryptographic hash function. This process, known as collision, 
allows the introduction of a rogue CA in the trusted list of the browser (Figure 12). 
 
 Figure 12 – Rogue Certification Authority  
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To complicate things even more for the user, the list of CA’s is very long, with so many 
unknown entities, that is difficult to determine who to trust. Who are QuoVadis Limited, 
TürKie Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştirma Kurumu – TÜBITAK or Sociedad Cameral de 
Certificación Digital – Serticámara S.A. appearing on Mozilla Firefox 3.6.15? 
One can argue that users should rely on more well-known CAs like VeriSign or VISA, but 
their certificates tend to be more expensive, leading some servers to employ self-signed 
certificates. An alternative might be for local servers (such as a local bank) to use a local 
trusted CA. A Portuguese user might think of the Multicert CA, with renowned local stake 
holders like SIBS (managing the ATM network, with more than 25 banks as their stake-
holders), CTT (Portuguese Post-Office), INCM(National Press), PT-Prime and PT SGPS 
(both belonging to Portugal Telecom). But Multicert is not on the default list of trusted 
CAs of common browsers. 
 
►The certificate is invalid or has expired 
With such a warning no user should proceed with the connection, unless he his fully aware 
of a specific reason why this certificate is either invalid or expired. Probably it would 
expose the users to DoS, if an attacker manipulates the user’s notion of time, but it is 
probably better to cancel and report the issue. 
 
►The common name of the certificate does not match the DNS name of the server 
Some online solutions do present certificates that do not match the name of the site. 
Although users may even be used to this behavior, browser policies should terminate 
immediately such connections. 
 
User perception of SSL is also mistaken due to the way some versions of browsers handle a 
certificate, clearly stating that information exchanged with the site, using SSL, could not be viewed 
or changed by others (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13 – Alert for detected certificate issue on IE 6 
 
Next, we briefly review the protocol used by SSL to create a connection, and indicate at each step 
potential problems that might occur while handling the certificates. Table 1 summarizes SSL 
negotiation, where shaded rows signal optional steps. 
 
CLIENT SERVER PHASE 
client_hello →  1 
 ← server_hello 
 ← certificate 
2  ← server_key_exchange 
 ← certificate-request 
 ← server_hello_done 
certificate →  
3 client_key_exchange →  
certificate_verify →  
change_cipher_spec →  
4 finished →  
 ← change_cipher_spec 
 ← finished 
 Table 1- SSL session establishment  
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A client_hello_message is sent by the client to the server, including the list of supported cipher 
suites. The server responds with a server_hello, selecting an appropriate TLS version and cipher suite 
to use in the initial SSL session. The server also responds with its certificate, and finishes with a 
server_hello_done message. The client and server then create a symmetric key, and in the end each 
side sends a change_cipher_spec message to notify each other that subsequent information will be 
protected under the agreed key. Finally, each side sends a finished message to its peer. 
The following actions may occur in each phase: 
► Phase 1 – this phase intends to initiate a logical connection between peers and to establish the 
security capabilities that will be used. It is initiated by the client, with the following arguments: 
 ► The highest SSL version allowed by the client  
 ► A timestamp and a random number to prevent replay attacks during the key exchange 
 ► A session ID, used to indicate either a new session or the renegotiation of an existing one  
► Cipher Suite that contains a list of cryptographic algorithms supported by the client, with 
preferred one on the beginning of the list 
 ► A list of the compression methods supported by the client  
► Phase 2  - Specific steps depend on the architecture deployed, namely the public-key 
encryption scheme used 
►Phase 3 – The client validates the server certificate 
►Phase 4 – Completion of the set-up of the secure connection, including that the key exchange 
and authentication processes were successful  
 
Some problems that may occur during the exchange include: 
► Downgrading 
A poorly configured client (or a vulnerable one) may be tampered with to provide a Cypher 
Suite in Phase 1 omitting recent cryptographic algorithms, and only containing well known 
weak ones. 
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► Invalid Certificates 
As we mentioned previously, a lesser astute user might be tempted to proceed with the 
connection, despite failed validation in Phase 3. We will describe next how this action can 
allow a successful MitM attack. 
 
Let us review why the example we mention so often (for example, in Figure 3, in relation to the site 
of Banco Espírito Santo) is so dangerous. 
As hypothesized by Moxie Marlinspike, in most cases SSL is not established directly through the use 
of https in the browser Uniform Resource Locator (URL), but instead trough:  
►Clicking on a link that contains an HTTPS URL 
►Through a redirect from a HTTP site using response code 302, indicating the resource resides 
temporarily under a different URI, where the temporary URI is given by the location field in 
the response 
 
These methods of redirection to the HTTPS site can lead to attempts to break, not the TLS/SSL 
connections itself, but the “switch” between the non-encrypted and the encrypted communications. 
The idea is to attack the transition from HTTP to HTTPS even before the establishment of SSL, and 
perform a MitM. It is therefore fundamental that the client has the capabilities to make a correct 
judgment while validating the certificate received from the remote server. 
 
2.2 Current status  
The following figures show the behavior of a single-certificate web site, in this case 
caixaebanking.cgd.pt:443, the site of the Portuguese State bank, Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD). 
Figure 14 illustrates a period of time where only one certificate is observed. This means that, during 
this period, no attack was attempted (observed) on the path between the Notaries and the server, 
involving the presentation of a new certificate, and the owner neither replaced the old certificate nor 
added an additional one.  
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Figure 14 - 10-day Key History for caixaebanking.cgd.pt:443 
 
Now, consider the observations for the same site, caixaebanking.cgd.pt, for a longer period of time 
(200 days). 
 
 
Figure 15 - 200-day Key History for caixaebanking.cgd.pt:443 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the case where a replacement on the certificate was made. Notice that the older 
certificate does not appear anymore in the last 77 days, suggesting it has been removed and replaced 
by a new one. 
Figure 16 displays a site with two certificates observed consistently during the last 10 days. Although 
only one certificate is observed by each site on some particular day, both certificates have been 
observed in other days. This situation lead us to conclude that this site has multiple certificates (two) 
that are consistently observed in space (by four Notaries) and in time (in this case, 10 days). 
 
22 
 
Figure 16 - 10-day Key History for bes-sec.bes.pt:443 
 
Now, consider Figure 17, where the same site was observed for a longer period of time. This figure 
illustrates a particular situation, where two certificates appear consistently and two other appear 
sporadically in a specific reduced time frame. This can indicate either an attack or the temporary use 
of those certificates by the organization (for example, for testing purposes). 
 
 
Figure 17 - 200-day Key History for bes-sec.bes.pt:443 
 
In Figure 18 it is possible to observe the results for another site (citibank.com) with multiple (more 
than a dozen) certificates. In such cases, there is no consistency among observations. We can see that 
some Notaries are not even aware of keys observed by other Notaries. 
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Figure 18 - 10-day Key History for citibank.com:443 
 
 
2.3 The Perspectives approach 
Perspective removes some of the uncertainty while in the TOFU process. By supplying the user with 
valuable information regarding the certificate provided by the service (for example, SSH access to an 
end host or HTTPS access to a web site that uses a self-signed SSL certificate), and leveraging views 
from multiple network vantage points, it avoids misinformation that could be introduced by localized 
attacks, and helps the user to determine whether to accept or reject the received public key 
certificate. It uses a set of publicly available servers (designated by Notaries), that keep track of the 
history of the public keys used by each network server, associated to a specific service, over time. 
The Notaries currently in use at the time of this writing are: 
  
 cmu.ron.lcs.mit.edu:8080 (128.2.212.179) 
 convoke.ron.lcs.mit.edu:8080 (204.225.124.41) 
 mvn.ron.lcs.mit.edu:8080 (66.232.160.65) 
 hostway.ron.lcs.mit.edu:8080 (216.139.253.36) 
 
The geographical distribution of the sites is illustrated in figure 19. 
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Figure 19 – Geographical distribution of Notaries 
 
By dispersing geographically the location of each Notary, a specific MitM attack should only affect a 
specific Notary. 
Similarly to a physical Notary, the Notary Server cryptographically signs (i.e., notarizes) statements 
saying that at time t it observed service S using public key PKu.  
When a client connects to a network service, it receives a public key (or certificate) in the reply. If 
the offered key has not been previously authenticated (i.e., it does not match an existing key in the 
client cache), the client must either accept the offered key, taking a security risk, or reject the key, 
losing the ability to communicate with the service. To obtain more information to support this 
decision, the client contacts the Notaries and requests from each one all observed key data for that 
service. Notaries get this information by periodically probing the servers for their certificate. This 
model has a simple deployment similar to SSH, since no central administration is required, working 
independently from both the servers that provide the certificates and clients requesting them.  
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The client then uses application-specific key-trust policies to interpret this data and accept or reject 
the key. These policies can be fine-tuned to each client, allowing customization to different user 
profiles or to match company policies, for example. These policies check for consistency between 
the offered key and the keys seen by each Notary, often allowing clients to distinguish between a 
legitimate key and an attack. For example, a key seen only by one Notary during last week will likely 
indicate a localized attack. 
Perspectives is tolerant to attacks on any path, as well as in components of the Notary infrastructure 
itself. The only requirement is the server and the client being completely trusted, a standard 
requirement for host authentication.  
The Notaries are organized in groups, and each group can be managed autonomously by an entity 
designated by Notary Authority (NA), with responsibilities to manage the Notary group, including 
determining the servers that are legitimate Notaries. Each NA as a public/private key, with the public 
key distributed to each Notary using an out-of-band mechanism. After the safe inclusion of a new 
Notary, the NA periodically publishes the list of certified Notaries, by signing with its private key, 
the IP and public key of each Notary. 
The probing ok keys is done daily by replicating the behavior of each service’s client (e.g., SSH or 
HTTPS) until the Notary receives the offered service’s public key, at which point it terminates the 
connection. Information about the public key is stored in the Notary database, where each entry 
contains a service-type (identifying the protocol) and a service-id (information required to contact the 
server, like hostname and port number). In addition, the database contains a history of the key 
observation over time, where each entry is designated by key timespan. Each timespan contains the 
observed key, and two timestamp entries containing the initial (tstart) and final (tend) period where the 
key was observed. Timespan creation or update is ruled by the following protocol: 
► if the observed key was observed in the last probing, tend is updated 
► if the key was not seen in the last probing, a new timespan is created with tstart = tend 
 
A client application is not required to contact the Notaries each time it accesses a service, but only 
when the offered key is not cached. This means that either the client never accessed this service 
before, or that the offered key is different from the cached one. To retrieve the observed data, the 
client queries the Notary by supplying the (service-type,service-id) pair. 
The received information from the Notaries allows the client to define new rules (policies) to either 
trust the offered key (continuing the access to the service), or reject it and terminate the connection. 
Recall that this information includes the Notary (each Notary defines a different spatial location) and 
the timespans (defining consistency observation of the key over time).  
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Perspectives provides a framework to define spatial and temporal consistency, by defining the 
following properties. 
 
Definition: For a set of n Notary servers, a service S, and a threshold q (0 ≤ q ≤ n) we say that a key 
K has quorum at time t iff at least q of the n Notaries report that K is the key for S at time t. 
 
Intuitively, for values of q that are large relative to n, a key that has quorum indicates consensus 
among the observations made by the all Notaries at a single point in time. Perspectives use another 
threshold parameter to extend the concept of quorum into the temporal realm. 
 
Definition: For a set of n Notary servers, a service S, and a quorum threshold of q, a key K has a 
quorum duration of d at time t iff for all t’ such that (t −d) ≤ t’ ≤ t the key K had quorum with 
threshold q at time t’. 
 
To detect malicious Notaries, Perspectives design includes data redundancy, a cross-validation 
protocol aiming to limit the malicious effect of a compromised Notary. This data redundancy 
capability is achieved by the role of a shadow server assumed by each Notary. A shadow server is a 
copy of the data of another Notary. Hence, when receiving key usage history from one Notary N1, 
the client has the capability of requesting that same information from the Notary N2, where N2 is the 
shadow copy of 1, that is, N2 maintains a copy of the data observed by N1 (the client can even 
request shadow information from n Notaries, since there can be several shadow copies of each 
Notary). If the received information from the shadow copy differs from the information received by 
the Notary, the client can suspect that either one could be compromised. 
Each Notary is responsible by the updating of its shadow server using a mechanism designated by 
cross-validation protocol. When a Notary contacts a service S, it updates its own local database, 
followed by the update of all shadow servers. Shadow servers are designed in a way to protect a 
malicious Notary from deleting previous entries. If a mismatch is detected, the shadow server stores 
both sets of data and signatures, signing both. 
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Chapter 3   
Solution for Certificate Polygamy 
3.1 Handling Multiple Certificates 
Having multiple certificates provides considerable benefits. One of these benefits is related with 
redundancy. For load balancing, a web farm is usually created with multiple servers handling the 
client requests. Client requests are spread between available servers, using simple algorithms based 
on an evenly distribution of requests, or more sophisticated that use information from the network 
and the server itself to decide what server will handle each incoming request. If all servers used the 
same certificate, a compromised server (thus, a compromised certificate) would affect all servers in 
the web farm. Having a distinct certificate in each server allows the revocation of that single 
certificate, leaving all other servers fully operational, without any downtime. Sites like Citibank 
handle multiple certificates (Citibank has over a dozen different certificates). Therefore, Perspectives 
needs to catalog all the legitimate certificates, by using an approach like the coupon collector 
[8,9,10] to estimate how many certificates exist, or to decide when to stop probing. 
 
The areas requiring investigation in order to Perspectives handle multi-certificate sites are: 
► Probing modules 
A probing module observes keys by connecting to the service and mimicking an ordinary 
client until it receives the service’s public key, at which point it disconnects. With multiple 
certificates, this behavior has to change by performing multiple probes. 
 
► Threshold and quorum parameters 
Quorum parameters have to be adjusted for certificate polygamy, since Notaries can observe 
distinct valid certificates, but different from the one that the client is seeing. Considering a 
specific service S, for n Notary servers, and for a quorum q such that 0 ≤ q ≤ n, q should be 
smaller compared to n, for servers handling multiple certificates. But this can impact single 
site certificates, so the suggested approach would be to separate thresholds for single and 
multi-certificate sites, possibly handling this at the client policy level. 
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► Client policies 
On single-certificate sites, the replacement of a key is well defined in time. If two keys are 
observed by different Notaries in the same time frame, it indicates a possible attack. With 
certificate polygamy, this could be a consistent behavior, and therefore it is not necessarily an 
attack. 
 
► Cross-validation protocol 
With singe-certificate sites, several checks are made considering one certificate, like 
timespans overlapping and common tstart values. This will not be an issue if care is taken 
while filtering with the current certificate. 
 
► Database 
A database entry is currently uniquely identified by the combination of a service-type, which 
identifies the protocol used to retrieve the key, and a service-id. Multiple keys already exist, 
but it is assumed valid keys do not overlap. With several certificates, although validations 
might have to change, no changes to the Notary database are expected, regarding multiple 
certificates. However, further investigation has to be done to evaluate the advantage of 
registering a flag indicating of the site/service is single or multi-certificate. 
 
3.2 Probing Module 
The probing module is a core component that needs to be aware of multi-certificate sites. For 
performance reasons, probing should be made in parallel, similarly to what is already done by the 
client querying n Notaries. 
The following steps describe the new behavior of the probing module. 
Step 1. Discover if the site has multiple certificates 
This could be achieved through multiple probing, although observation of multiple certificates by 
several Notaries can also start this procedure. 
For an estimated population of N certificates, the probability of observing O certificates after P 
probes is given by (O/N)
P
. For example, for a populations of 20 certificates, the probability p of 
observing 12 certificates after 30 probes is given by (12/20)
30
, which is ~2,2x10
-7
. To discover if a 
site has multiple certificates, we can start by assuming that it has only 2 certificates, so we can 
calculate the probability using the formula (1/2)
P
 (based on one observed certificate and an estimated 
population of 2):  
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Number of Probes Probability % 
1 50 
2 25 
3 12.5 
4 6.25 
5 3.125 
6 1.5625 
7 0.78125 
8 0.390625 
9 0.1953125 
10 0.09765625 
11 0.048828125 
12 0.0244140625 
13 0.0122070313 
14 0.0061035156 
15 0.0030517578 
Table 2- Probability of more than 1 certificate after p probes  
 
By defining a threshold Ɵ representing the minimum probability we want to achieve while probing, 
we can stop probing after a pre-defined number of probes, as detailed in Table 2. For Ɵ = 0.008%, 
then14 probes would be sufficient to assume the site has only one certificate.  
This procedure would only be started if we encounter a new certificate, since we do not require a 
daily probing to check for an increment of certificates, we do not observe any new certificate. This 
procedure will also allow determining if the certificate was replaced, since only the new one would 
be observed. We should recall that the procedure should not be done immediately, while the user is 
waiting for the access, since probing without delay would possibly generate cached responses from 
the server, returning the same certificate, as explained in section 4.3. Probing and Caching. 
 
Step 2. If the site uses a single certificate, the current behavior still holds 
In this case, no changes are required to the probing module. 
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Step 3. If the site has multiple certificates, we need additional probing: 
 
Step 3.1. Estimate the number of certificates (N) and probe them. We suggest considering the same 
number of certificates in the beginning of the probe. 
When determining the population estimation, one of two scenarios may occur: 
a) Service Type/Service-ID seen for the first time 
 
We will need to apply the coupon collector solution considering the observed population size. 
Examples are presented in Annex I. 
 
 
b) Daily probing 
 
For daily probing we assume the number of certificates to be N, the last observed value, and 
apply the coupon collector solution to obtain a coverage δ (that is, we make an observation of 
at least Ɵ% probability). 
 
While doing this probing, the following 4 situations are expected: 
 
i) # of certificates is correct. This is the most common case 
We do not see a lot of collisions and no new certificates 
 
ii) # of certificates has declined 
 
We infer this case when we see a lot of collisions 
 
iii) # of certs increased 
 
This will be the case when we see a new certificate 
 
iv) # certificates is the same, but they were replaced 
 
We see simultaneously new certificates and a lot of collisions 
Annex I provides additional details and sample results to apply The Coupon Collector Problem to 
digital certificate probing. 
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3.3 Threshold and Quorum Parameters 
In a single certificate (or public key) environment, Perspectives provides additional security to the 
users by allowing them to have an enhanced view of the site certificate, both in space and in time. 
This is achieved by viewing the certificate from distinct vantage points in space and in time. 
Perspectives introduces the following definitions: 
 
Definition: For a set of n Notary servers, a service S, and a threshold q (0 ≤ q ≤ n) we say that a key 
K has quorum at time t iff at least q of the n Notaries report that K is the key for S at time t. 
 
Intuitively, for values of q that are large relative to n, a key that has quorum indicates consensus 
among the observations made by the all Notaries at a single point in time. Wendlandt, Andersen and 
Perrig [1] use another threshold parameter to extend the concept of quorum into the temporal realm. 
 
Definition: For a set of n Notary servers, a service S, and a quorum threshold of q, a key K has a 
quorum duration of d at time t iff for all t’ such that (t −d) ≤ t’ ≤ t the key K had quorum with 
threshold q at time t’. 
 
In multiple certificate sites, the observed behavior should not change considerably when compared 
with single certificate sites. However, due to possible caching of replies when a client Notary probes 
the certificate, it is expected that a smaller set of Notaries report seeing a specific certificate. If a site 
caches the IP address of the Notary probing for the certificate, it will reply the same certificate in a 
future probe. This will result in this particular Notary being unaware of other valid certificates for the 
probed site. When a client later contacts the Notaries requesting information about the certificate, it 
is expected that a larger number of Notaries do not know of the existence of that particular 
certificate, when compared to a situation where caching does not occur. If the threshold q remains 
unchanged, many multiple certificate sites would trigger alerts on the browser that probably could 
lead to the rejection of the certificate. 
To address this issue, one possible solution would be to decrease the value of q. However, this 
solution would have the following disadvantages: 
► in single certificate sites, lowering the threshold q will raise the number of false negatives, since 
only a smaller set of Notaries would have to report the existence of a particular certificate to 
render it valid to the user; 
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►in multiple certificate sites, it is admissible to have a lower value of q, but additional care should 
be taken, namely to ensure a higher geographical distribution of the Notaries. This could 
increase the difficulty of the adversary to perform a MitM attack. 
 
We suggest the inclusion of an additional threshold, z, to define the geographical zone of the Notary. 
Figure 20 already demonstrates the existing spatial redundancy. Even in a single certificate site 
solution, the geographical distribution can be expanded to a worldwide area. 
 
 
Figure 20 – Worldwide geographical distribution of Notaries 
 
The reason we expand this concept of spatial redundancy, even in the standard Perpectives solution 
for a single certificate site, is to leverage the concept to worldwide usage. This has two main 
advantages: 
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► Raises redundancy to a worldwide level 
For example, a problem affecting the US servers (or link) would render Perspectives useless in 
Europe, if all Notaries are located in the US. If European users can also rely on Notaries placed 
in Europe, Asia and Australia, they still might gather a quorum large enough to trust the offered 
key 
► Eliminates suspicions of Notaries based only in one country or region 
Potentially, users in China would not trust a set of servers located in the US, or vice versa. 
Consensus trough a quorum of servers located in distinct geographical areas is a more 
trustworthy scenario (at least, for a relatively large number of users) than the same number of 
quorum servers in the same area   
 
The next step, illustrated in Figure 21, is to include each Notary location in a predefined Zone, 
according to a geographical criterion we previously determined. Since the geographical distribution 
aims at avoiding localized attacks, this criterion should be set considering the available Internet links, 
since compromising a link will compromise all the Notaries dependent on that particular link. 
 
 
Figure 21 – Worldwide geographical distribution of Notaries, by zone 
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We now extend the criteria of acceptance of a certificate by requiring that, amongst the n Notaries 
that consistently see it, be localized in at least z Zones. This threshold, z, should be tuned considering 
the required policy and the number of available Z zones.  
Going one step further, and considering an increment on the number of available Notaries, we can 
extend this concept to localized geographical distribution. For example, taking the European zone, 
we could further divide it into subzones. Surely the density of countries in Europe is high, when 
compared to, for example, Australia. 
 
 
Figure 22 – Geographical distribution of Notaries, by smaller zones 
 
We can now introduce the updated criteria. 
Definition: For a set of n Notary servers, Z zones (Z ≤ n), a service S, and a threshold q (0 ≤ q ≤ n) 
we say that a key K has quorum at time t iff at least q of the n Notaries, localized in at least z of the Z 
zones, report that K is the key for S at time t. 
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3.4 Client Policies Enhancement 
Geographic zones can be used to provide additional information to the user, allowing him to take a 
more informed decision. We present for comparison some behavior scenarios with and without zone 
information. We use the term cached key to refer to a key already cached by the client, and the term 
cached certificate to refer the ability of a server providing a specific service to present the same 
certificate key based on the requester Notary IP address.  
 
Single certificate site: No-Zone aware behavior, no server key cached 
Although the key is not cached, it does not necessarily mean that the key is compromised or a MitM 
attack is in progress. If the user is accessing the service for the first time on her local machine, this is 
the expected behavior. However, if the user accesses this service on a frequent basis, she might be 
suspicious, but it does not mean that an attack is in progress. It may be that the provider of the 
service just renewed the certificate or introduced an extra one. The user should try to understand if 
the key has been observed by many Notaries, regardless of their physical location, and the duration 
of the key history. If the key replacement and quorum duration is satisfied, the policy provider may 
supply a message like (similar to the single certificate site version of Perspectives): 
Key seen consistently for the past d days 
 
If the observed quorum or duration does not achieve the minimum values defined by the policies, the 
user might be warned with a message like: 
SUSPECTED ATTACK: Offered key is NOT consistent. Only X of Y Notaries currently see it. 
WARNING: Server key has only been seen consistently for the past d days. 
 
We may be facing either a new certificate or an attack. It is up to the user to decide the appropriate 
action to take. An experienced user might validate the key using an alternative channel while a non-
expert user could be advised to reject the key and try later on, in the expectation that, during that 
time, more Notaries will also observe the key. 
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Multiple certificate site: No-Zone aware behavior with offered key different from the cached 
key 
In this case, we can no longer assume an uncached key as a key change, but the behavior is not too 
different from a single certificate site because the space and time policies still apply. If we face a 
scenario where there is a proxy between the server and the Notary, which does caching, then it will 
be much harder to get a quorum. The main difficulty is that when the Notary probes the server, it will 
get the same cached certificate from the proxy, instead of a random certificate from the full set. In 
this case, we can expect more policy alerts, and as previously explained, one solution would be to 
lower the quorum value.  
Lowering the threshold q will prevent additional rejections due to non-achievement of quorum, 
eliminating the effect of caching to reach quorum consensus. To prevent this change from affecting 
single certificate sites, we could introduce different quorums for single (qs) and multiple (qm) 
certificate sites, where qm ≤ qs. However, this implies that there is a policy where qm ≤ qs, which 
could only be effective with qm and qs defined for each site, according to their role. This solution 
implies a higher administration overhead. The administration could be too complex because it would 
have to be done at the server level, not at the Notary. As an alternative, we present the zone-aware 
alternative, with much less administration effort. 
 
Single certificate site: Zone aware behavior 
Compared with the scenario of no-zone aware behavior with single certificate site, no server key 
cached, security is only improved if, for the user, there is a special significance of a broader 
geographical location where certificates (hence, Notaries), are observed. Having defined z (zone 
threshold) and Z (total number of defined zones), the user might see a warning like: 
WARNING: Key seen consistently for the past d days but only observed in X out of Z zones 
 
But the biggest challenge will be to differentiate between a single certificate site doing a certificate 
replacement, and a single site starting to use a new certificate. In the latter case, it means that it is no 
longer a single certificate site, but it has been promoted to a multiple certificate site. However, this 
distinction should be done at the level of the probing module. The user she could receive a message 
like:   
SUSPECTED ATTACK: Offered key is NOT consistent. Only X of Y Notaries currently see it in z of Z zones. 
WARNING: Server key has only been seen consistently for the past d days and previous key is still in use  
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If the probing module considered that the observed key is an additional one (not a replacement) then 
at this point the site would be already considered a multiple certificate site and the policy would not 
consider the use of the previous key an issue.  
 
Multiple certificate site: Zone aware behavior 
As compared with the alternative of different qs and qm to distinguish sites with or without 
certificate caching, the zone-aware approach has the benefit of simplicity, because qs and qm would 
be parameters at the server level, while zone is at the Notary level. Obviously, the number of 
Notaries is significantly less that the number of servers, and zone maintenance would be managed as 
part of the Notary administration. 
The behavior would be similar to the previous case, excluding the check made on the use of the 
previous key. 
 
3.5 Cross-validation Protocol and Shadow Servers 
To protect clients from accepting malicious data from a compromised Notary, each Notary keeps 
images of their data in replicated servers known as Shadow Servers. When a client contacts a Notary, 
it also contacts r shadows (defined by the client policy) to confirm data, and detected inconsistencies 
that would allow the detection of untrusted Notaries. 
Currently, in single certificate sites, when the client contacts a shadow server for a copy of the 
observed key data for service s, it specifies the IP address of the Notary as well as the requested 
service. The shadow server replies with a service entry containing the key data and the signature 
created by the Notary, along with the shadow server signature of that data. 
Since multiple certificates are expected, in the current version of the cross-validation protocol, to 
reflect key history, no changes are required. Figure 23 details the protocol, where the client specifies 
the IP address of N and the service-id from the original query to N. The shadow server replies with a 
service entry ON (observed key data and signature) created by N, along with the shadow server’s 
signature over that data. 
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  Figure 23 – A client (C) contacting shadow server (SH) for a shadow copy of Notary  
N’s observed key data for service s 
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Chapter 4   
Testing and Analysis 
 
4.1 Evaluation 
In this chapter we evaluate how easy it is to perform a MitM attack on a LAN segment of an end 
user, our “victim”. The attack we want to perform depends on the access to the LAN where victim is 
located, and therefore we exploited some common vulnerabilities to get this access. First, we selected 
a hotspot at a hotel, and tried to obtain illegitimate access, without the need to identify ourselves with 
credentials. These environments are not familiar to users, since different hotels have different 
solutions, so any disturbance due to the attack would not generate additional suspicious to the victim, 
as a different behavior at his home or office would. 
In the second part of the chapter, we probed sites with multiple certificate sites to understand how 
random certificate delivery is, and to test the effect of caching. These tests allowed us to conclude 
that the solution proposed in the previous chapter can be used to solve the problem of multiple 
certificates. 
 
4.2 Example attacks on LAN 
We tested a number of scenarios to conclude if the vulnerabilities are feasible to explore, with a 
relatively small effort. We selected a public place (hotel hotspot), home wireless networks, and, once 
access is possible, attacks on DNS in order to facilitate MitM attack. 
 
4.2.1 Attack on a hot spot 
The idea was to test unauthorized access on a hotel hotspot. A paid hotspot was found that could 
provide access to an open wireless network. Everyone in range could get access to the wireless LAN. 
Once connected, access was redirected to a login page, where the user was requested to supply a 
user/password to gain Internet access.  
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  Figure 24 – Login page for Internet access on a Hotel hotspot 
 
For our experience, it would be enough to get access to the wireless network, and spoof it to obtain 
other user’s traffic information. By running Wireshark one could eavesdrop the network. However, 
to perform a successful MitM attack, one would need Internet access to forward the request. Of 
course that could be achieved with a 3G or GPRS connection, but we assume attackers do not want 
to use their own resources. So, we tried to get full access to the network, including Internet access.  
We then viewed the login page source code. 
 
Figure 25 – Source code for the login page for Internet access on a Hotel hotspot 
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We can easily conclude that the server sends a challenge with which the client builds a string 
including the supplied password. We can even see the server full page code from the link referenced 
in the source code in Figure 26, http://192.168.88.1/md5.js. 
 
 
Figure 26 – Sample of server source code 
 
We spoofed network traffic to see a challenge from the server (Figure 27), and the matching 
resolution from the client (Figure 28 and Figure 29). 
 
Figure 27 – Server challenge 
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Figure 28 – Client response to challenge 
 
 
Figure 29 – Detail of client response to challenge 
 
A brute force attack could reveal the password in an acceptable time frame, as long as the password 
policies are simple enough. Our plan was to try: 
► Numeric passwords from 1 to 12 digits 
► Lower case characters from 1 to 12 digit 
► Upper and lower characters and digits, from 1 to 12 digits 
 
We stopped at the first scenario since the password was a 4 number digit. Since the number of 
password can be calculated by  
                 max 
n = ∑Ci  
              i=min 
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where C denotes the character space for each position in the password, min the minimum password 
length, max the maximum password length and n the number of possible passwords, in this case we 
have: 
                 4 
n = ∑10i = 104 = 10000 possible passwords 
              i=4 
That allows an extremely quick brute force attack to get access to the Internet. 
An attack spoofing DNS query request, replaced with our own IP would then create the initial 
conditions to try to perform a MitM attack. 
 
4.2.2 Attack on home router 
We access several home routers from PT. We used the same default credentials supplied in our own 
installation, with password “3!Play”. All routers installed by PT teams within reach have the same 
password. 
 
4.3 Probing and Caching 
In this experiment we wanted to evaluate the existence (or not) of caching when probing a site for a 
certificate, using the same origin IP. We created a shell script running on Ubuntu Linux, inside a 
Virtual Machine (VM) running VMWare workstation version 7.1.3 build-324285 on a Microsoft 
Windows 7 Professional with Service Pack (SP) 1 host.  
 
Figure 30 – Probing for certificates 
44 
 
We performed 1000 continuous probes on Citibank, with no delay at all. Results are summarized in 
Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31 – Probing results with 1 second delay between probes, on Citibank:443 
 
We can notice a cycle of around 30 seconds in which the returned certificate is always the same. We 
hypothesized that the server uses a 30 second validity cache, during which it always replies with the 
same certificate. However, we were expecting to see more than two certificates, since, in our initial 
probe, as mentioned in Figure 13, more than one dozen certificates were observed. Since more than 
200 days have elapsed since the results presented in that figure were observed, we decided to probe 
again the Notaries for the data. Results are shown in Figure 32. 
 
 
 
Figure 32 – Another 10-day Key History for citibank.com:443 
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We can observe an increased inconsistency in certificate observation, when compared to our first 
query for Notary results. Some Notaries do no observe any certificate, while others observe one 
certificate sporadically. We did query the Notaries again for a 200-day key history. Results are 
shown in Figure 33. 
 
Figure 33 – Another 200-day Key History for citibank.com:443 
 
Facing the results we hypothesized that Notaries results were cleared about 70 days ago, but that 
proved not to be the case, since history existed for other sites (like bes-sec.bes.pt:443), as shown in 
Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34 – Another 200-day Key History for bes-sec.bes.pt:443 
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Therefore, at this moment, we do not have a good explanation for the recent behavior of the Citibank 
site.  
 
Figure 35 – Probing results with 10 second delay between probes, on Citibank:443 
 
In any case, from the probing tests, and facing the collected results, we observed a consistent 
behavior with the following steps: 
► the site randomly selects a certificate 
► the same certificate is always returned during a specific period, around 30 seconds, a default 
value for most common web servers 
 
From the observed results we can conclude that continuous probing does not improve certificate 
discovery (possibly being masquerade by caching mechanisms), suggesting a delay between probes 
larger than usual caching values, in a magnitude possibly larger than 5 minutes. 
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Chapter 5   
Conclusions and Future work 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
As a first impact, we noticed that vulnerabilities due to improper setup on network components is 
still a very devastating flaw when attempting to attack a site, even when protected by SSL. From 
weak policies to misconfigured components, we encountered several situations where these flaws 
lead to vulnerabilities very easily exploited. 
We concluded that the benefit of using multiple certificates is not a regular practice, even in sites 
with redundant servers. We could not find a handful of sites using more than two certificates. Even 
when two certificates where found, it seems that they are not consistently seen, which could indicate 
that they were either replacements or test certificates (only observed in a specific, small (couple of 
days) time frame. 
From the observed results we can conclude that continuous probing does not improve certificate 
discovery (possibly being masquerade by caching mechanisms), suggesting a delay between probes 
larger than usual caching values, in a magnitude of at least 5 minutes. In any case, an increasing in 
the probing frequency not only allows the Notaries to become aware of multiple certificate sites, but 
also increases the accuracy for observed certificates. 
We have proposed a comprehensive solution to address multiple certificate sites. This solution 
encompasses changes in several components of Perspectives, including the management of policies 
and the creation of quorums in the Notaries responses. 
 
 
5.2 Future Work 
Additional study on caching has to be done to validate the results of probing and the effect of 
caching. It seems that sites have not yet seen the benefit of using multiple certificates. 
Further analysis should be done on the cross-validation protocol to study the impact of returning all 
history from multiple certificates, or just the certificate currently seen by the client.  
The definition of function f(N) in order to define the minimum number of probes require further 
study. 
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Some improvements to Perspectives may include: 
► Upon receiving responses from the server with invalid signatures, the client can collect data 
instead of just discarding the message, since it may indicate an on-going attack, possibly 
reporting that to the Notary Authority; 
► Handle airports and hotels. Since laptops cannot access the Internet at these locations, we 
could have laptops submit certificates they've learned about in those situations. If we obtain a 
sufficient number of observations, then we would add the certificate to a database, which 
clients can periodically download for off-line verification. Of course, we would need to study 
the case where an attacker submits observations for its own malicious access points; 
► Determining how on-demand cloud computing resources might be used to power Notaries.  
One of the "big picture" ideas behind Perspectives was that computing resources (CPU, 
bandwidth, etc.) for automated probing keeps getting cheaper, while human time to manage 
PKIs does not.  Using a cloud platform could let us put an exact $ amount on the cost of 
monitoring X sites; 
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Annex I 
The Coupon Collectors Problem applied to 
digital certificates 
 
In probability theory, the Coupon Collectors Problem describes contests where a customer is 
required to collect all different coupons to win a prize. Imagine that a cereal brand includes 1 picture 
(out of 50 different possible pictures) inside each cereal box. The customer is required to collect all 
50 different pictures to claim a free trip to Maldives. In our case we assume the following rules for 
our contest: 
►The number of copies of each picture is similar (we only win if we are one of the first x 
customers to present all the pictures, where x is the number of trips available); 
 
►Each time one box is taken from the shelf, a new one replaces it. This means (like in our site 
with multiple certificates) the probability of getting a particular picture is the same each time 
we buy a cereal box. 
 
As mentioned in [8], if we have N certificates, the expected number of probes to get all certificates is 
P = N · HN where HN is the harmonic         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
. 
 
If a site has 50 certificates, how many probes do we need to perform to get all the certificates? The 
expected number of probes is 50H50, which equals 225. A sample of results for probing until 80 
certificates is shown is Figure 36. 
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Figure 36 – Expected number of probes to retrieve all digital certificates 
 
This probing method can generate a considerable amount of probes for sites with a large number of 
certificates. For example, 36 certificates would require 150 probes.  
For that reason, we suggest the application of probabilities, assuming a population of the same size 
last observed. Any variation would be recalculated dynamically, during the probing process, 
considering the observed values. Let´s recall that, for an estimated population of N certificates, the 
probability of observing O certificates after P probes is given by (O/N)
P
. In the rest of this section we 
will present some examples, using the following convention: 
δ = Treshold 
N = Estimated number of certificates 
β = Current number of observed certificates 
P = Current number of probes performed so far 
Ɵ = Current Probability  
 
The probing will be done according to the algorithm shown in Figure 37. 
 
 
P = 0 
Do Probe() 
 P++ 
 if ( NewCertificate ) β ++ 
 Update (Ɵ) 
While { Ɵ ≤ δ } 
N = β 
  
   Figure 37 – Probing algorithm 
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Example 1: 
Results are returned within the expected probability, so only after an increase in P will the probing 
stop.  
 
δ = 0,003  
N = 5 
β = 4 
P = 27, since Ɵ = 0,002417851639229 < δ 
 
 
Example 2: 
Now consider the following case: 
 
δ = 0,003  
N = 15 
β = 1 
P = 3 
Ɵ = 0,000296296296296 < δ 
This case could be due to an existing cache. To minimize this effect, one could impose a minimum 
number of probes, as a function of N. If we consider m the minimum number of probes and f(N) the 
function determining the minimum number of probes, we would update the algorithm as shown in 
Figure 38. 
 
P = 0 
m = f(N) 
do Probe() 
 P++ 
 if ( NewCertificate ) β ++ 
 Update(Ɵ) 
While { Ɵ ≤ δ & P < m } 
N = β 
  
   Figure 38 – Probing algorithm with minimum number of probes 
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Example 3: 
Update on example 2 with minimum probes required: 
 
δ = 0,003  
N = 15 
F(N) = 
 
 
 N 
m = 10 
β = 10 
P = 15 
Ɵ = 0,002283658260521 < δ 
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Conventions 
 
t = Time 
I = Number of Initial Probes to determine is site is multi-cert 
P = Number of Probes 
PKu = Public Key 
K = Key 
S = Service 
n = Number of Notaries 
q = Quorum of Notaries 
qs = Quorum of Notaries in a single certificate site 
qm = Quorum of Notaries in a multiple certificate site 
z = Zone threshold 
Z = Total number of defined zones 
δ = Treshold 
N = Estimated number of certificates 
β = Current number of observed certificates 
Ɵ = Current Probability 
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